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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
OF TTTAH,
Plninti ff-Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
11588

EU\VARD HAROLD SCHAD, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction
of rnnrder in the second degree and from the trial court's

denial of the motion for a new trial.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
'rhe appellant was charged by information with the
crilnP of murdn in the first degree and was tried by

a jnry which returned a verdict of guilty of murder in
tlw SP<·ornl dt>gree. Appellant's motion for a new trial
\\a;.;

dPnied.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the jud1:,'11lent of conviction, or alternatively, to have the trial court's denial of
appellant's motion for a new trial reyersed and the case
remanded for a new trial.

OF FACTS
At 7 :30 p.m. on July 5, 1968, Lynda
Olson discovered the nude body of her hrotht>r, Clare Odell
Mortensen, in a clos('t in his aparh1wnt on the lower
Avenues in Salt Lake City (T 112). The decedent's
hands were bound behind his back with leather thong1'
and small-diameter nylon cords which were tied rather
loosely and v,dth simple overhand knots (T 118, 419).
The ankles were also bound ( T 155), and two pieces of
cloth had been tied around the face and neck (T 157, 403).
At the time the body was found the front door of the
apartment was locked (T 148), but the back door was
ajar (T 105).
A post-mortem examination disclosed that the decedent had engaged in both active and passive anal
sodomy (T 405, 417), as well as fellatio (T 416) near
the time of death. Bruises and scratches were fonnd
on the knees and legs of the deceasPd and tlwre were
superficial abrasions on the iwni:-; and scrotmn (T 405).
Dr. JamPs T. "\Veston, thP medical examinc>r who per-

3
formed the autopsy, testified that the cause of death
\ms rl·strirtrd venous return of blood from the brain
eaused hy the ligature placed about the decedent's neck
( T 408). Dr. Weston testified, however, that the ligature
was not tight enough to impair the supply of blood to
the brain (T 4:31 ). From this, Dr. Weston concluded that
the purpose of the ligatures had been to heighten erotic
stimulus during an act of sodomy immediately prior to
death ( T 493, 655), and that the death had been acci<kntal (T 494). The time of death \rns fixed beitween
noon and 10:00 p.rn. Jul.'· 4, 1968 (T 409).
It was shown at trial that the decl"<ient had for a
long pt·riod of time engaged in acts of anal sodomy
( 11 +05). In addition, he had suffered from paralysis
( '1 1fi2), which was attributed to a tumor found in the
dee<'dent's hrain (T 439). rrhere was testimony that the
<l"('P<l<:·nt had PxperiPnced frequent diz11y spells (T 172)
and liad constantly used a variPty of prescription drugs
for his varions physical ailments (T 96, 172). Dr. Weston
that the drugs and the tmnor could have contrilmted to
canse of death (T 435, 442).
1

Appt-llant had been seen in the company of decedent

at 11 ::30 p.rn. on July 3 ( T 89). A neighbor testified
that slir ha<l talked with appellant outside the decedent's
honw at 9:15 p.m. on July 4 (T 184), but had not seen
app<:•llant enter or leave thE> decedent's residence at that
filll(' (T 22G). Another neighbor testified that he had
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seen appellant r<>placing a windff\\' screen at the decedent's apartment at 8 :15 a.m. on July 5 (T 209). Appellant
testified that he had left Ft. Lewis, vVashington on July
1, 1968, and arrived in Salt Lake City at 4 :45 a.m. on
July 3 (T 470, 472). Upon his arrival he went to a cafe,
where he met the decedent (T 474), who invited appellant to stay at his apartment (T 475 ). Appellant accepted, and followed decedent to the apartment at 6 :00
a.m.. on July 3 (T 477). Thereafter, he accompanied
decedent to a local tavern, a friend's housP, and another
tavern, returning to the apartment at :00 p.m. ('r 518,
519). At about 4:45 p.rn., the two a.gain left the avartment and visited two taverns (T 520, 5:22). Decedent
left appellant alone at midnight (T 522) and appellant
accompanied three other persons on a trip to the Great
Salt Lake (T 289, 5254). Returning at 6 :00 a.rn. on
July 4, appellant went again to decedent's apartment (T
525, 526). After drinking coffee appellant and the decedent went again to a tavern (T 527) where appellant
testified that the decedent carried on an intimate conversation with a heavy-set man (T 530). The two invited
appellant to attend a rodeo with them, but appellant
declined (T 531). The decedent then took appellant to
another tavern and left him then• at 12 :30 p.m., after
which appellant testified he never again saw the decedent
(T 531).
Appellant left the tavern at 9 :00 p.m. on July 4,
and walked to the decedent's apartment (T 533), where
he talked with the neighbor and picked up his belongings
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from thP hack porch of the decedent's apartment (T 536).
He <l<'nied returning to the apartment and replacing a
window sneen on the morning of July 5 ( T 621), and
the ('\ idPIH'P indicated that the neighbor might well have
heen mistaken a:-:; to the description of the person who
r<:>pla<'Pd tlw S('l'ePn ( T 4fi7-8).
It was shown at trial that appellant had purchased
an airplane ticket to Germany (T 273), and that he had
used a eredit card belonging to the decedent to obtain
m01wy with which to purchase the ticket ('r 279). Appellant admitted having used the credit card unlawfully
('l'
and testified that lw found it in the pocket
of a shirt which lw had loaned decedent and which dec:l·dent had retnrm•d ('r 61G). There was also testimony
tliat appellant had discardt>d CPrtain items of the def'l'dPnt's personal property at a motel where he stayed
on .]uh· -1: (T :!+fi, 250), lmt a])lwllant denied this (T 543).

Ap1w!La11t lPft Salt Lake City for Germany at 10 :30
p.m. on July 5 (T 308), and was arrested by the military
authorities in Hauau, Germany, at 11 :30 a.m. on July 8,
for being absent \vithout leave (T 336). At the request
of the American military authorities, the German Police

n·coyered app0llant's two suitcast>s and turned them over
to the military approximately one hour after appellant's
UJ'l'('st ('l1 3:3). The suitcases and other items taken from
app<'ll:rnt were then mailed to the United States Army
Crirni11al Tnwstip:ator at Fort Douglas, Utah (T 353),
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and were opened by a Salt Lake City Police Officer
\ T 357). Certain items of evidence taken from tlw suitcases, as well as the suitcases themselves, were admitted
in evidence at avpellant's trial over the objection of defense counsel ( T 341).
At the close of the evidence, thl' trial court withdrew
from the jury's consideration the charge of murder in
the first degree (T G90). In its instructions to the jury
the court charged that appellant conlcl liP found guilty
of murder in the second degrPe if tliv jm:' believed that
the killing of the decedent was co11rn1itt1•cl hy the appellant during the perpetration of an act of sodomy hy
appellant with the decedent (T G97, R 40). Timely execption was taken to this instruction (T 776-777). The jury
returned a wrdict of guilty of mnrdPr in the second
degree (R 29). Appellant's motion for a new trial (T
778, 785) was denied ( T 795).

POINT I
THE FELONY MURDER INSTRUCTION RELATING TO SODOMY WAS ERROR BECAUSE ONLY
FELONIES WHICH ARE IN THEJ\ISELVES INHERENTLY DANGEROUS TO HUMAN LIFE CAN
SUPPORT THE APPLICATION OF THE FELO:NY
MURDER RULE.

7
Under

Utah Code Ann., (1953):

"D<'grces of murder. murder perpetrat<'d hy poison, lying in wait or any other kind
ot' wilful,
malicious and premeditated
killing; or committed in the perpertation of, or
attem1lt to per:iwtrate, any arson, rape, burglary
or rolJbery; or perpetrated from a premeditated
design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the
death of any human being other than the one who
is killed; or perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others and evidencing a
depraved mind, regardless of human life; - is
mmder in the first degree. Any other homicide
committed under such circmnstanccs as would
have constituted murder at common law is murder
in the second deqree." (emphasis added)

In the case at har, it was the State's theory that if
a lion1ic·idP was committed by ap1wllant during the commission of sodomy, tlw homicide -would constitute murder
in tlll' st•c011d degree, sinc0 at common law a homicide
('OlllrnittPd during the perpetration of any felony was
mt1rder. 'l'his theory was embodied in instruction no. 12.
lt is submitted that the trial court committed reversible
error in so instructing the jury, since only felonies which
are in themselves inherently dangerous to human life
v.-ill support application of the felony murder rule.

'!'his Conrt has not previously spoken on the point
now in issnP, and it becomes necessary to examine the
c]p\

Plopment of case law in other jurisdictions. In Cali-
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fornia, where the second degree felony murder rule is in
force, the rule has been strictly limited to cases involving
a felony which is inherently dangerous to human lifr.
In People v. PhillirJs, G4 Cal. 2d fi7 4, 51 Cal. Rptr. 22:J,
414 P. 2d 353 (1966), noted in 55 Cal. L. Rev. 329 (19G7L
the California SuprPme Court held that a homicide n·sulting from the ddendant's false represPntations that
he could cure cancer -without surgery conld not he a
second degree felony rnnrdE·r lwC'ans<· tli0 und<•rlying
felony must bt> one which is in itself in]H·n·ntly dangerous
to hmnan life in order to justify ap1ilicatio11 of the felon:·
murder rule. Since the undPrlyinp; frlon:-·, ciz., fo.n'<'n:·
by false pretenses, was not "inlH•n nti>· <lang0rons to
lnunan life," the court in Phillips conclnd(•d that a felon:
murder instruction was error.
Similarly, in People 1:. Lovato, G5 Cal. Rptr. 638 (5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1968), it was held that the possession of
a concealable weapon by an alien is not a felony "inherently dangerous to human life," so as to make a houi.icidP
committed by the alien a second d0gr0e felony murder.
It is thus clear that the Phillips limitation of sPcond
degree felony murder to feloniPs which are inlwn•ntly
dangerous to human life is firmly establishPd in California law. See also People ·r. /rrln11d, 75 Cal. Hptr. l SS,
450 P. 2d 580 (1969) (in hank) modified 011 de11iul of
re hen ring; People v. ClinP, 7:5 Cal. Rptr. 459 (4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1969) (holding that furnishing of plienolbarhital
is "inherently dangerous" felony); Peo1Jle 1 TVWiums, 63
Cal. 2d 452, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7, 40(i P. 2<1 G.±7 (19G5) (con1

•
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spiracy to possess methcdrine not "inherently dangerous"); P<'oplc v. Ford, 36 Cal. Rptr. 620, 388 P. 2d 892
(lDG-1) (in hank) rehearing denied.
Jn Prople v. Williams, supra, the court noted that
t lie pnrpose of th<-' fp]on>- murder rnle was to deter felons

from killing rn·gligPntly or accidentally during the commission of crimes. rp}w court then stated:
"'L'l1is }Jllrpose may he well served ·with res1wd to felonies :;;nch as rohhery or burglary,
lmt it l1as little rt'levanc(• to a frlony which is not
inltPl'(•ntJ:,· dang-erons. If tl1P frlmi>- is not inherPll t ly clang<'rou:-; it is 11ig-hl>· imprnhahle that the
11ot<·11tial J'don will h<-' dPt<'l'l'Pd; hP will not ant i('i pat<· tliat an» injur:' or dPath might ari:-;P
:-;ol<·h- fr0111 tlie fad that l1P will commit tlw f Plon>." 1;:i ('al. :2d at .J:i'"i7. -!'i Cal. Hptr. at 10, -J.Ofi
P. :2d at lii"JO.

A recPnl Delaware case has
aeeeph'd
the California rnle. In Jcukius 1;. Stall', 230 A. 2d :2fi:2
(D<'lawan' 19G7), the defendant had been convicted of
i'C'lony i1111nl<'r wlH'rP the undPrlying felony was burglary. 1n n·vPrsing tlw com·iction, the Dt>lawarP Court
<·xarni1wcl th<' common law felony murder doctrine, noting
that in England, ewn before its completr abolishment in
1
th" dortrinP had at an early date bt>en limitPd to
kHown to lw clangerons to life." Regina 1'. Ser-ne, lG
l'o>; Cr. Cas. 311 (18S7). Noting that the California

10
Court has recently developed a similar limitation upon
this application of the felony murder doctrine, the court
in Jenkins states:
"In our judgment, the California
is supported by logic, reason, history and common sense.
The only rational function of the felony murder
rule is to fumish an added dderrent to the perpetration of felonies which by their nature or by
the attendant circumstances crPate a foreseeable
risk of death. This function is not sPrved by application of this rule to felonies not forseeably dangerous. The rule should not b(• Pxtended beyond
its rational function. MorPowr, application of
the rule to felonies not fol'('Sl'(•ahly dangerous
would be unsound analytically because there is no
logical basis for imputing malicl? from the intent
to commit a felony not dangerous to human life ....
"(T)he felony second degreP murder rule of
this State should he limitPd to homicides proximately camwd by the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of folonies which are by nature or
circnmstancPs forseeahly danw•rous to human lifr
whetlwr Ruch feloni(•s hc- (•ommon la\\- or statutory." 230 A. 2d at 2G9.
The California limitation of the felony murder rule
to felonies inherently dangerous to human life has also
been adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court. In State v.

Moffitt, 199 Kan. 514, 431 P. 2d 879 (1967), rehraring
denied, the court held that in order to support the application of the felony murder

the attendant felony

must be one which is inherently dangerous to human life.
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It is therdore ammrent that the application of the
<·0111111011 law f('lony mnrder doctrine in cases involving
felonit•s ,,·Jiich do not in themselves pose a danger to
lnnnan lifr eannot he justified in light of the experience
of modPrn criminal jurisprudence. The rule itself has
hei·n tlH· :-mliject of S<'n>re criticism, and it is oft-repeated
that the doctrine Rhould not be extended beyond any rational fonction it is designed to serve. People v. TV ash111qto11, G:2 Cal. 2d 777, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446, 402 P. 2d
L:lO (l!:IGG); Notf, 55 Cal. L. Rev. 329 (1967). It is subrnitteu that tl1e applil'.ation of the felony murder doctrine
in the case at bar amounted to an unwarranted extension
of the doctrine, and constituted prejudicial error. Ewn
if it he as:m1111•d that the homicide lwre occurred dming
the peqwtration of an act of sodomy, the homicide, hy
that fact alone, sLould not be deemed a second degree
111 u nlPr, :-iini'e
is not inherently dangerous to
lmman lifr. Indeed, fop application of tlw felony murder
rnle in the instant case eannot he jrn.;tified on an>· ground.
ff the f Plony mnrder doctrine wen• to he held applicable

to any

n•gardlPss of its nature, tlw result would

lw lndi('l'Olls indeed.

For example, a homicide which

oecnrrPd dnring the conunission of a forgery would of
Jt<•eessity IH' di•enwd a second degree murder irrespective
of the n:-;nal elements of malice and intent to kill if such
a position wen' adoptHl, and even though forgery itself
is in no way inherently dangProus. Similarly, numerous
otlwr feloni(·:,;, non<• of which pose any danger whatsoP\ ('l'

to lmrnan lift., would support application of the rule.
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It is clear that to apply the rnle in these cases would
serve absolutely no purpose, and ·would run countPr to
whatevE>r logic tlw doctrine might still <'TI.JOY.
Finally, it is significant that tltP crime of sodomy,
although constituting a felony at the time of the homicide
been the suhjeet
involved in the instant case, has
of reconsideration by the Utah Legislature. Under
53-22, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as arnernkd by
1969, Ch. 244,
any sodomy whi<'h rnig-ht have been
involved in the case at bar would 110,v eon"titute at most
a misdemeanor and would not support application of
the felony murder doctrine rc•gardlv'-'s wlwtlwr the ''inherently dangerous to human lifo" limitation were to bl·
adopted by this Court. Implicit in om legislature's reduction of consl'm:nal sodomy from a fp]ony to a misdt>meanor is the recognitinn that sodomy lwhn•Pn consentingadnlts is not so serious an ofi'en:-;c• as was once ht->lievt>d.
Indeed, it is snhmitt<>d that tlw off PnsP of :-;odorny, w!H'll
it involves consPnting adn\t:-;, i:-; in no way a thrcat to
lnunan life or health.
Because of this recent- re-evalution of the severity
of the crime of sodomy, and heC'arn..:c of thP fundm1wntall:·
sound principles involwd in the limitation of the frlony
murder doctrine to felonies inherently dangerous to lift>,
this Court is urged to adopt that limitation and therPby
hold that the trial court's instruction no. 12 was prejudicial error.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO CONVICT APPELLANT.

Tlw eYi<h·nce adducPd to connect appellant with the
l10mi<'idP was entirely circumstantial, as was admitted
l>y the District Attorney in his closing argument (T 712).
Ii is snlnnift<·d that this evidence was insufficient as a
matter of law to support appellant's conviction. In this
n·spect, it is dear that a stricter test will be applied by
n_.vit>wing C'ourts wlwre the evidence is entirly circumstautial. A case decided during the tt>rritorial days of
this Ntate illustrate this point. In PeozJ!e 1 Scott, 10
[tah :217, ;37 P. 335 (1894), tlw d<>fendant was grantPd
a nP\\' trial for failure of the trial court to instruct the
jury regarding th<· d<·gret> of proof rPcp1ired where the
l'\·id<'l1CP
<•ntirl'ly circumstantial in naturt>. 'l'he court
tlwn sta t!:'d that in snd1 cas<>s, tlw circumstances pron'n
must
1•

" ... incompatible, npon any reasonable liypothesi:,;,
\\·ith the innocl•nce of tht> accused and incapablt•
of <'Xplanation upon any reasonable hypothesis
otl1<'1' than the defendant's guilt. The chain of
c:ircmnstnnec·s rnnst be complet<' and unbroken."
10 l'talt at :2:2:2, 37 P. at 336.
'!'lie rnl<• announced in the Scott case was followed in the
case of State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P. 2d 285 (1941),
1ehcuri11q dr11ird, in ·which a conviction for conspiracy to
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violate anti-vice la\vs was attaekf•d upon the ground,
inter a.Zia, that the evidence, entirely circmnstantial, was
insufficient to support the conviction. In affirming the
conviction, the court explained the standard relating to
circumstantial proof.
"(vV)here the proof of a necessary fact is dependent solely upon circumstantial evidence, such
circumstances must be sn<'h as to reasonably exclude every reasonable hypotlwsis other than the
existence of said fact and lw consistent with itR
existence and inconsistent with its non<:>xisten<'e.''
101 Utah at 400, 120 P. 2d at :m:2.
The Utah Court reaffin1wd tltP 1"i'cott formulation
m State v. Crairforrl 59 Utah i39, 201 P. 1030 (1921).
Reversing a conviction for third degn•e hurglary, the
Court held that defrndant's attempt to escape while in
custody for a rohlwry was not such a circumstance as
would permit the inference of the defendant's guilt of a
burglar>'· The court statt>d that wlwr<> only circumstantial evidence of guilt exists, in ordPr for a circmnstance
even to be probative:
"the circumstancP rnnst lw sm·h as to exclude
every reasonable hypothesis except that of tlw
defendant's guilt ... "59 1Ttah at 45, 201 P. at 10:33.
In State v. Burch, 100 Utah 414, 115 P. 2d 911 (1941),
defendant had been convicted of branding a calf helonging to another person with intent to steal the calf. This
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Court, reviewing the evidence, noted that there was "not
one ultimate fact necessary for conviction that is substantiated by direct evidence," and that all the evidence
had been wholly circumstantial. In reversing the conviction for insnfficiency of the evidence the Court said:

.. r1' circmnstantial evidence is submitted to
a jury ... that evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence . . . . But if the
is such that reasonable men would not
di.ffer upon the fact that it includes such an hypothesis, tJwn it is not a question for the jury, but
is one for tlH' court." 100 Utah at 417, 115 P. 2d
at 912.
It is thus apparent that the strict rule regarding
tlw sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to suport a
convirtion as announced in the Scott case, S'Upra,
has bePn n•peatedly reaffirmed by this Court. See also
State v. Garcia, 11 utah 2d 67, 355 P. 2d 57 (1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970; State i:. Anderson, 108 Utah
130, 158 P. 2d 127 (1945); State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402,
131 P. 2d 805 (1942).

The stricter requirement as to circumstantial evidence has been variously expressed by the courts in other
jurisdictions.
example, the California Court has
stated:
"(vV )here circumstantial evidence is relied
upon as proof of guilt to justify a conviction, the
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facts and circumstances must not only be entirely
consistent with the theory of guilt but must be
inconsistent with any other rational conclusion."
People v. Watson, 4fi Cal. 2d 818, 299 P.2d 243,
250 (1956) (in bank) rehearing denied.
Similarly, the court in State v. Gunderson, 444 P. 2d
156 (Wash. 1968), held that if two postulates, guilt and
innocence, can be drawn from evidence which is entirely
circumstantial, the innocence postulate must be accepted.
So too, the Kansas Court in State v. Tulley, 196 Kan. 56,
410 P. 2d 267 (1966) stated that wlwre there is only
circumstantial evidence, the facts must he inconsistent
with any reasonable theory of the dPf Pndant's innocence.
See also Jackson v. State, 403 P. 2d 518 (Okla. 1965):
State v. Johnson, 57 N.l\L 716, 263 P. 2d 283 (1953); State
v. D·en·nis, 177 Ore. 73, 159 P. 2d 838 (1945) rehearing denied.
From these cases, it is manifest that the evidence
in the case at bar was Pntir('ly insufficient to support
a conviction. No direct proof was adduced to show any
connection of appellant whatsoever to the homicide. In
fact, there is not a shred of evidence to place appellant
at the scene at anytime near the time of death. Tested
in light of the rule of the Scott case that the evidence, if
wholly circumstantial, must be incapable of explanation
on any rational hypothesis other than the guilt of the
accused, the evidence in the case at bar falls far short
of the standard required. For this reason, the conviction
should be reversed.
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POINT III
THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE APPELLANT'S

SUITCASES

AND

THE

ITEMS

CON-

TAINED THEREIN BY THE GERMAN POLICE,
THE U.S. ARMY, AND THE SALT LAKE CITY
POLICE

WERE UNREASONABLE UNDER THE

FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.

The law is well settled that a search made by official
authorities ·will be: reasonable under the Fourth Amendment only undPr one of the following three circumstance:s:
( l) Pursuant to a search warrant. Aguilar
TP:ras, 378 P.S. 108, 12 L. Ed. 2<l 723 (1964)

i:.

(:Z) Incident to a lawful arrest. [(er v. Californilt,
374 F.S. 23, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963).

( 3) 'Vi th tlw consPnt of the owner of the place or
itPm
Stonrr v. California., 376 U.S. 483,
11 L. ld. 2d 85G (1964).
t

d

n

-t
n

ln tlw ease at bar, the search made by officer "Wesley
was admittedly made without a search warrant and without the consent of appellant.
no warrant or official
order was issued, even in Germany, by the United States
military authorities which directed the seizure of the
evidence in question. Accordingly, the search of appellant's suitcases and the use of items taken therefrom
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in evidence against appellant at trial wen• justified only
if made incident to a lawful arrest. Clearly, however,
such was not the case. In a recent decision, Chime! t.
California, ________ U.S. ________ , 5 Cr. L. Rptr. 3131 (19G9),
the United States Supreme Court t>xaminPd the purposp
of the rule permitting a search incident to a lawful arrest,
and noted that the rnle "'as one of neeessity to pn•vrnt:
(a) The destruction of Pvidt>m'P
arrestl-'d; and

the person

(h) the dang-<-'r to poliee offie<•r inherent in a
situation wlwre the p<>rf'on n1T<>stPd might ht>
an1wd, and then•fore pot<·ntially a threat to the
saf<>ty of thP offiel'L
Since these two functions may lw eomph•tely satisfied
by a search limited to the aiTPsted iwrson's hody and the
area within his immediate control, the court in Chime/
declared that searches incidPnt to a lawful aiTest an
valid only if they do not ext<•nd lwyond that an'a. 5 Cr.
L. Rptr. at 3136. However, in the instant casP, appellant
had no access whatever to his snitcmws suhseqnt>nt to
arrest in Gennany, and therefore eould not han-' <h•stroyed any evidence they might contain. Morpover, it
is recognized that a search is "incident" to an arref't
only if it is reasonably contemporanc>ous therewith. Preston v. U.S., 376 U.S. 364 (19G-!). Here, the seizure by
German authorities took
one lumr after avpellant's
arrest, and the search by the t-;alt f_.akt> City authorities
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occurred severed days thereafter. rrhus, both the seizure
and search of the suitcases were in no way sufficiently
dose in tiwe to appellant's arrest to be deemed "incident"
therdo, and thPrefore cannot be justified on that ground.
rl1lii1', coupled with the fact that the suitcases were far
appl'llant's access and control at the time of the
seizure and search, required that the authorities obtain
eithr>r a search warrant or appellant's consent before
vroceeding with the search. The record is clear that they
did neitlwr. As a result, the seizure of the suitcases by
German lJolice at the request of United States Army
authorities, and the search by Salt Lake City Police Officials was not a reasonable search under the United States
Constitution, and the admission in evidence of items obtained i11 the i-Warch was reversible error. This is espeso in the instant case where the evidence connecting
a ppvl lant to tlw homicide was meager both in quantity
arnl probative forct>. It is submitted that to permit tlw
us(, hv tlw 8tate of these items consequently amounted
to gravely prejudicial error, and requires that this Court
rt>vers<' the conviction.
CONCLUSION
It is dear that appellant's conviction rests upon an
unwarranted extension of a rule of law which itself
Las little or no logical foundation, and which should be
limited to felonies inherently dangerous to hmnan life.
Moreover, the evidence, entirely circumstantial in nature,
was insuffirit>nt in law to warrant the conviction. Finally,
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part of that evidence was obtained m violation of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
'l'hese reasons, individually and collectiYely, compel this
Court to reverse the conviction, and, in its discretion1
grant appellant a new trial.
Hespecfnlly 8ubmitted,
JAY D. EDMONDS

Attorney for Appellant

